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this is not just a theoretical confusion, it affects the health and lives of real people.
You may or may not be aware, but there is a significant kerfuffle that has long been brewing on the fringes of feminist activism between two camps or philosophies about the proper way to address the social ills in and around the industrial provision of sex for sale.
On one side you have a variety of old school, traditional feminist views. These views are informed in large part by a traditional feminist idea that the sale of sex is always already the oppression of the sold body. Since the vast majority of prostitution and pornography involves the sale of female bodies, the traditional feminist view of the power structure inherent in prostitution and pornography is that the industries involved in that sale are central pillars of patriarchal oppression.
The view opposed to the traditional feminist appraisal of pornography and prostitution is variously called “3rd wave” or “sex-positive” feminism because it takes a specifically different view on the question of commercial sex. Rather than viewing it as inherently oppressive, this current tends to view the sale of sex as something that can be exploited but that is not inherently exploitative. Further it postulates that for some women, who it describes not as prostitutes but as sex-workers, the sale of sex is something that can be done through an empowered free choice without negative social consequences like the patriarchal oppression of women.
The Cytyzen Cypher views words like “patriarchy” and “oppression” as unrelentingly ideologically loaded and that therefore that they should be avoided by serious people attempting to engage in reasoned discourse. That said, we are not attempting here to lay out a philosophy of prostitution or pornography, but rather to describe two different views about those industries in our present global capitalist economy. For an outsider it is difficult to reconcile or understand the two because both claim the imprimatur of “feminism” a term itself so ideologically loaded at this late date that it itself is probably become nearly meaningless beyond signifying some sort of claim about concern for the rights of women. Beyond that, who knows. As our favorite professor occasionally quoted another scholar as saying, we believe a feminist is just one who asks the question “how does this affect women.”
Many people who claim to be feminists, in our view, fail to pass this rather simple test, but again, this is the danger inherent in all ideology. A problem for another time.
Unsurprisingly, then, when it comes to policy proposals about how to deal with the undeniable social ills of prostitution (incarceration, exploitation, the spread of STI, rape, violence, death, serial killers, abuse, and everything else that typically comes with your typical capitalist wage slavery) these two camps have very different ideas about what we should do.
The Traditionalists favor a legal approach that has come to be called the “Nordic Model” because it was pioneered by the Scandinavian socialist states, and Sweden in particular. The concept underlying the Nordic Model is that prostitution is a bad thing but the women (and men) in prostitution are not criminals but victims. To that end, the Nordic Model has as it’s goal an end to the demand for commercial sex. To achieve that goal it eliminates criminal sanctions for the sale of sex and only imposes criminal penalties on the purchase of sex or pandering.
The Sex-Workers rights groups, by contrast, think that the Nordic model is bad because it will lead to further harm against prostitutes. They argue that John’s will be worse because of the fear of punishment, and that the decriminalization of the sale of sex alone will lead to collateral consequences for issues like housing and access to services among sex-workers. They often rally behind the slogan “sex work is work” and approach the question from the position that women who wish to sell sex should be empowered to do so in a de-stigmatized environment no different from the provision of other services. They argue that the continued criminalization of the purchase of sex will lead to the continued stigma of sex workers and the concordant socio-economic disadvantage that comes with it.
I see serious problems with both of these views. On the one had, the Sex-Workers rights groups do have a point that there seem to be some percentage of women who would like to work as sex workers and whose individual autonomy should be enough to empower them to do so while at the same time taking full advantage of the services available to everyone else. To the extent that the Nordic Model, or an “end-demand” approach actually takes as it’s primary goal an end to the sale of sex, it is not putting first and foremost the actual problems of the women working in prostitution and may create collateral consequences for them that are unjust, and made manifestly more so by the fact that most sex workers are from disadvantaged socio-economic classes.
On the other hand the critics of the nordic model who favor full decriminalization often fail to attack the theory of the nordic model and instead focus on particular problems in particular jurisdictions that at least theoretically could be address by a better written law that would still be The Nordic Model. For example, Amnesty International has recently released a report on Prostitution in Norway that calls for the end of the Nordic Model and its replacement with New Zealand style full decriminalization of the sale of sex. The report–available online here–explicitly equates the Nordic Model with the Norwegian legal framework:
This report, therefore, does not consider the impact of the ban on purchasing sex in isolation. Rather it considers how the range of laws that prohibit commercial sex in Norway – and make up the so-called “Nordic Model” – impact on the lives and human rights of sex workers. It also considers how other laws – such as immigration provisions – are being used in a targeted way against people who sell sex, as a means to reduce/eradicate sex work.
Now, the authors of the report should be commended for being upfront about their bias in this way. However, given how intellectually dishonest this move is, it’s difficult to look uncritically at the rest of their reporting and take it at face value. Why is this intellectually dishonest, you ask? Because what this criticism of the Nordic Model in fact amounts to is the argument that Norway has failed to eliminate all of the negative consequences for sex workers in Norway. The only honest conclusion one could draw from that is that Norway has implemented a flawed version of the Nordic Model that has failed to actually legalize the sale of sex despite its claims to the contrary. So far, so good. However, this is then used by the reports authors as a criticism of the Nordic Model itself. That is, what the report says is that Norway has failed to implement the Nordic Model so the Nordic Model should be abandoned in favor of Amnesty’s preferred policy of full decriminalization. The logical flaw here is obvious and damning of Amnesty’s position and the credibility of its report.
That has not stopped it from being accepted at face value by the growing cadre of credulous hacks at the New York Times. The Sex Work Policy Beat at the Grey Lady is covered by a reporter named Emily Bazelon who has, again to her credit, been upfront about her personal believe that full decriminalization is the right policy solution. That said, she is generally quite bad at separating her personal bias from her reporting as her article on the Amnesty report reveals. Rather than noting the report authors’ sleight of hand in substituting Norwegian law for the Nordic model and then pretending as though their criticisms of the former apply to the latter, Bazelon accepts it uncritically and without comment:
Norway adopted the Nordic model in 2009 (following Sweden, which did so in 1999).
Amnesty also calls into doubt the claim that the Nordic model effectively combats trafficking, calling the Norwegian government’s evidence to this effect “fundamentally weak and undermined by alternative evidence.” Out of 280 reported cases of sex trafficking from 2006 to 2014, only 32 ended with a conviction.
In researching my article, and in the outpouring of criticism of it from abolitionists, I couldn’t find a convincing case for the Nordic model. Let’s see what the response to Amnesty’s latest reports brings.
Now perhaps one should not expect such rigor from a New York Times staffer but Bazelon is also a research scholar at Yale Law School and a distinguished graduate of that same institution so she presumably understands the difference between a model law and any given state’s implementation of that model. As such, this conceptual slippage has to be either another example of ideological blindness or a sort of sloppy reporting that is unfortunately becoming par for the course at the much diminished Newspaper of Record. Bazelon is either being willfully ignorant, or she’s phoning this in without doing her job. There really isn’t a third option.
All of which is not the same as saying that the critics of the Nordic Model don’t have a point. Many of the criticisms described in the Amnesty report are damning of the Norwegian program and, to the extent that one wants to make the claim that the Nordic Model can only be implemented in the way that Norway has and therefore the problems described in Norway are inevitable, there could be the skeleton of a legitimate criticism here.
The problem is that no one in this debate is operating in good faith and the available data is all so badly biased by the “researchers” preconceptions that it’s difficult for a third party to come to the debate and reach an informed conclusion.
This is the fault of the traditionalist supporters of the Nordic Model as much as anybody. Bazelon has been attacked unfairly for her her families connections to George Soros, for her Ivy League “elitism,” and for the fact that she failed to disclose the claim that Amnesty’s decriminalization policy was in part authored by a pimp in the UK. See, for example, this article that reiterates all these claims. Considering Bazelon’s unflinching admission that she’s on the side of the decriminalizers, all of these claims amount to little more than slander for slander’s sake. We know Bazelon’s bias, via her own admission, and there’s no ethical requirement for her to unearth her entire personal history to show why that bias might exist in order to be a good faith participant in the public discourse on this topic.
Even worse, the insistence by traditionalists of referring to all sex workers, prostitutes, and even pornography performers as “prostituted women” or “trafficking victims,” serves to confuse the issue for outsiders since these are terms of art within their own ideologically informed discourse that do not mean the same things as most outsiders would take them to mean. Professional sex workers like the many women who loudly and vocally proclaim that they have a right to earn a living through the sale of their bodies in sexual service to others should be taken at their word that they are not deluded, pathological, or in need of “saving.” By failing to recognize this, traditionalists minimize the agency and humanity of the women they purport to represent and their own claims must accordingly be examined only with deep skepticism.
So where does that leave the nonspecialist outsider wondering what policy is best? I believe it leaves us precisely nowhere. In a republic this is a serious problem because it means that lawmakers of good will and the voters who elect them are faced with an insurmountable challenge in trying to craft a policy that will achieve all the various ends of preventing exploitation and sexual slavery, allowing individual women the agency to make the choices that make the most sense for themselves, ensuring that women who choose sex work can do so safely and seek police protection for crimes committed against them, preventing the legal collateral consequences of sex work from further harming women’s lives, and giving women who don’t wish to engage in sex work an easily available exit from the industry.
These are all serious problems that face us all and that we are all complicit in failing to address. It’s unfortunate that the activists who care most about it have so muddied the waters of policy that we find ourselves more paralyzed and unable to reach a valid opinion on the policy matter the more we dig into the topic.
This writer expresses clearly and succinctly some of the thinking that motivated me to create this blog. I don’t agree with everything here, in particular the idea that there’s some sort of Liberal Media Machine that is directed by something other than groupthink and advertising revenue. But the rise of the long dormant totalitarian left in the United States should be an alarming development to all right thinking people. And yet there are so few who seem to care…
There’s a red-diaper baby named David Horowitz, who, after many years as a prominent activist, flipped from the far left all the way to the conservative far right. He’s the editor of a right-wing journal, and the tagline on his site is
I used to scoff at the utter absurdity of that notion. Everyone knows that to be on the left is to value free speech, human liberty, social justice, and equality—the complete opposite of authoritarian thinking.
But I now understand what he means, despite stringently disagreeing with nearly everything he stands for politically.
I’ve been a knee-jerk leftist my entire adult life. Like many of my ilk, until recently, I had pretty much endorsed every tenet of progressive-liberal dogma as received wisdom, not bothering to give any of it much thought when it came to the voting booth, or whose side I was on in any debate about politics…
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Where personal identity is concerned, there is a widespread naive attempt to situate it in the brain to adapt the superstition of the self to a secular humanist world that relies heavily on a naive scientific materialism that most people don’t even recognize as something they believe in. And yet it is there whenever a question of identity is raised, fixing in place the role of individual as submissive subject to the mass cultural war machine.
It is becoming more and more visible in the gender wars that are brewing in Anglo-American Law. We might learn something from how the Iranians use these same issues as a means to oppress homosexual men. But that would require thinking about things rather than uncritical acceptance of the fashionable explanation of the moment. This is the religion of the depeche mode, and I worry we will reap what we have sown.
New Statesman: What is Gender Anyway?
Is a language possible in which the well-formed sentence eschews a subject? Linguists, I think, categorize languages in one way by the manner in which the basic sentence structure orders three components: subject, verb, and object. In English, we put them in that order, but Japanese, for example, uses Subject, Object, Verb order. In English the sentence “the dog chews the bone” is well-formed. In Japanese, the same sentence would be “the dog the bone chews.” It is interesting to me that the latter sentence is still meaningful and well-formed in English, but the meaning has changed and now the bone is chewing on the dog rather than vice versa.
Ludwig Wittgenstein suggests, in his posthumously published manuscript Philosophical Investigations, that one way to go about finding out what something means is to consider how native language users use that word in context. Thus, if we want to know what the meaning of “life” is, we should look to which contexts or, in Wittgenstein’s terminology, which “language-games” we can imagine native English speakers using the word life. From this consideration and others like it, Wittgenstein believed it was possible to identify a “form of life” particular to language users that gave a ground for the proper use of language. When language users step outside of that ground, language “goes on holiday,” and the things the language users say stop having any meaning.
Wittgenstein should not be understood as a nominalist, however. His belief that people were often talking nonsense was not a belief that the things they were attempting to express by talking such nonsense were unreal. Rather, Wittgenstein was a mystic who believed that certain things intrinsic to our form of life were so basic that it was impossible for language to speak about them without exceeding the limits of what language could do. That is, trying to express certain aspects of life was something like the Baron von Munchausen’s legendary feat of lifting himself off the ground by grabbing hold of his own pony tail and hoisting himself up into the air by pure strength. Expressing the ineffable is not impossible because the ineffable isn’t real, but because you need the ineffable to be under your feet in order to say anything meaningful at all.
That last paragraph is not exactly true, and not exactly meaningful, but it’s close enough for government work.
What then of identity? If to talk about ourselves we must insert ourselves into our sentences because of the rules of our language, does this mean that the subject of those sentences is real? Or is this an illusion created by our form of life given to drive us mad with postulations about the soul, the spirit, the psyche, the mind, the identity? My working hypothesis is that it is. There are many reasons for this, but the most important for me is that more than anything else I need to believe that I am free to make choices and if my identity is a thing that is fixed within me than that forecloses on all manner of choices that have been predetermined by the nature of that identity. If it is there, even in a very weak form, it must represent certain attitudes and predilections and preferences that I am unable to escape from despite whatever choices I might wish to make.
Perhaps in some cases this is true. I do not believe, for example, that I have much choice about the foods and flavors I enjoy. There are flavors that I like and flavors that I don’t like. I don’t believe I could choose to dislike chocolate no matter how much I tried. However I do have some choice. For example, there are some foods that I have initially taken a dislike to that after time and more exposure I have engaged in the activity that we call “developing a taste” for them. By doing this I have taught myself how to appreciate elements of the foods flavors that were initially instinctively repugnant and thereby chosen to like something that I initially did not. If my tastes and preferences were fixed by my identity, this would not be possible. But surely if anything is fundamental to who I am, ie my identity, it is my preferences for some things instead of others. If those preferences are mutable, as the act of “developing a taste” shows them to be, then might not I be able to choose to dislike chocolate?
And if something so fundamental to identity as taste can be mutable, is there anything that isn’t? What then does this mean for a theory of identity that posits as primary self-identification? I will suggest, although I will not argue the point now, that such a theory is basically unworkable and that “identity.” whatever that is, is not something we have within us but rather a mask that we are forced to wear by others.
If this is true, then identity is always already a form of oppression that must be rejected if we are to be free and equal participants in our society and politics. What that means for the political tactics that fall under the rubric of “identity politics” I leave to be examined at another time.
Working Hypothesis: Post-Feminist mass culture has uncritically adopted a view of how the language of sex and gender works that is both sexist and incoherent.
Comment: This would not be a problem except that it is a view that has been medicalized through the work of transgender advocacy. It is heartening to see a physician questioning the standards of care for gender non-conforming children that have been so uncritically derived from this incoherent popular philosophy of gender.